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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF SPEECH - LIQUOR LICENS-
ING REGULATIONS GOVERNING NIGHTCLUB ENTERTAINMENT ARE A
RATIONAL EXERCISE OF THE STATE'S AUTHORITY UNDER THE
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT, EVEN THOUGH EXPRESSION PROTECTED
BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT Is PROSCRIBED.
California v. LaRue (U.S. 1972)
Plaintiffs, various nightclub owners and entertainers, brought suit
against the director of the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control (the Department) challenging the constitutionality of statewide
regulations governing entertainment on licensed premises and seeking
injunctive relief." A three-judge district court held that the regulations
concerning films and live entertainment abridged expression protected by
the first and fourteenth amendments and enjoined their enforcement.
2
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in the context of
state licensing of bars and nightclubs to sell liquor, regulation of live
entertainment and film exhibition was valid as a rational exercise of
1. LaRue v. California, 326 F. Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal. 1971), revd, 409 U.S. 109
(1972).
The California Constitution established the Department and authorized it
to license and regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages in furtherance of the public
welfare and morals. CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 22. In 1970, the Department held public
hearings on "live entertainment" in bars and nightclubs and received testimony
concerning such entertainment as "topless" and "bottomless" dancers, nude entertain-
ment, and films depicting sexual acts. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 110-11
(1972). Evidence received linked such entertainment to public sexual acts between
customers and entertainers as well as to various sex crimes. Id. at 111. As a
result the Department specifically restricted the content of films and live entertainment
presented on licensed premises. Id.; California Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control Rules 143.2-5 (1970).
2. 326 F. Supp. at 350. Plaintiffs' challenge was directed primarily at
California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control rules 143.3 and 143.4. Rule
143.3(1) provides in pertinent part:
No licensee shall permit any person to perform acts of or acts which
simulate :
(a) Sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy, bestiality, oral copulation,
flagellation, or any sexual acts which are prohibited by law.
(b) Touching, caressing or fondling on the breast, buttocks, anus or
genitals.
(c) The displaying of the pubic hair, anus, vulva or genitals.
Rule 143.4 in relevant part prohibits:
The showing of film, still pictures, electronic reproduction, or other visual
reproductions depicting:
(1) Acts or simulated acts of sexual intercourse, masturbation, sodomy,bestiality, oral copulation, flagellation or any sexual acts which are prohibited
by law.
(2) Any person being touched, caressed or fondled on the breast, buttocks,
anus or genitals.
(3) Scenes wherein a person displays the vulva or the anus or the
genitals.
(4) Scenes wherein artificial devices or inanimate objects are employed
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the state's broad authority under the twenty-first amendment, 3 even though
expression protected by the first and fourteenth amendments was pro-
scribed. California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
Because first amendment rights are afforded a "preferred position"
in our constitutional scheme, 4 various judicial safeguards have been
developed to insure their preservation. Thus, whenever first amendment
rights are involved in legislation, "precision of regulation must be the
touchstone,"'5 and although legislation may legitimately proscribe conduct
unprotected by the first amendment, if it simultaneously prohibits pro-
tected conduct, it may be invalidated as overbroad.6
The protection afforded first amendment rights by the overbreadth
doctrine is evident in a variety of fashions. For example, legitimate legis-
lative concerns, which might well support other regulations, are insuffi-
cient to justify those which impinge upon first amendment rights, absent
a demonstration of a compelling state interest justifying the infringe-
ment. 7 Furthermore, in assessing the due process afforded by procedural
safeguards employed in a statute restraining speech, the Court will apply
"close analysis and critical judgment" in light of the circumstances. 8
The Court has gone to great extremes, particularly in the area of film
censorship, to formulate precisely those procedural standards required to
insure adequate protection of expressionY
3. 409 U.S. at 115, 118. See notes 27-33 and accompanying text infra.
U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 provides:
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of
the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation
of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
4. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). See McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1182 (1959).
5. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). See Coates v. Cincinnati,
402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) ; United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967) ; Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). Cf. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617
(1968) ; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562 (1965).
6. In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), the Court characterized this
doctrine as follows:
[Elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
Id. at 488 (footnote omitted).
7. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) ; United States
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967) ; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ;
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524
(1960). Furthermore, the Court has held that an individual has standing to challenge
a statute imposing criminal sanctions on the basis of first amendment overbreadth,
whether or not his particular conduct could have been legitimately prohibited by a
properly drawn statute. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) ; Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). It is not, however, necessary for a restriction on
speech to impose criminal sanctions in order to come within the bounds of the
overbreadth doctrine, for, if the statute unconstitutionally conditions first amendment
rights, it may be invalidated on overbreadth grounds. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-10 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18-19
(1966). See generally O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with
Strings Attachcd, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966).
8. Speiser v. Randell, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958).
9. See, e.g., Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971) ; Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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It must be noted that to secure the benefits of these first amendment
safeguards, however, the expression involved must be, in the first instance,
constitutionally protected. To be protected, expression must possess a
communicative element, in the sense of expressing an idea. 10 Although
the spoken or written word is generally communicative, all such expres-
sions do not qualify for first amendment protection." Similarly, diffi-
culties arise when the expression takes the form of public conduct, em-
bodying both non-communicative and communicative elements. 12 In United
States v. O'Brien,13 the Court rejected the notion that all conduct through
which an individual intends to express an idea falls within the purview
of the first amendment. Apparently, the Court must first find a "suffi-
cient" communicative element in order for first amendment principles
to apply.'
4
When confronted with regulations promulgated by the California
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control restricting the content of live
entertainment and films in bars and nightclubs,15 the three-judge federal
court in LaRue applied these traditional first amendment principles. It
correctly concluded that, on their face, the regulations proscribed con-
stitutionally protected theatrical entertainment and films in bars and
nightclubs, and accordingly placed an unconstitutional condition upon the
10. Thus, in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Court stated:
The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people....
All ideas having the slightest redeeming social importance . . .have the full
protection of [the first amendment] ....
Id. at 484. See also Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952)
Finnis, "Reason and Passion:" The Constitutiozal Dialectic of Free Speech and
Obscenity, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 222, 241 (1967). The Court has indicated that the
distinction between expression which tran~smits ideas, as opposed to mere entertain-
ment is "much too elusive" to be drawn. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510
(1948).
11. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity not protected
speech) ; Beauharnis v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (libelons utterances not
protected speech).
12. See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (handbill distribution)
Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) (street skit) ; Street v. New York,
394 U.S. 576 (1969) (flag burning) ; Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969) (wearing of black arm bands) ; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968) (draft card burning) ; Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963)
(protest demonstration); Teamsters Local 695 v. Vcgt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957)
(labor picketing).
13. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
14. Id. at 376. Given a sufficient communicative element to bring the first
amendment into play, the Court specified the conditions under which state regulation
of the non-communicative element can impose an incidental restriction on the protected
communicative element:
[Such] government regulation is sufficiently justified if [1] it is within the
constitutional power of the government; [2] if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedom is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
of that interest.
14. at 377 (emphasis added).
15. See note 2 supra.
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granting of a license.16 Specifically, it noted that the regulations could
not be justified merely as a prohibition of obscenity since the Depart-
ment did not even remotely purport to apply the constitutional test of
obscenity in proscribing performances and films containing content of a
sexual nature.'7
The Department contended that live entertainment was not speech
within the meaning of the first amendment and that, therefore, the regu-
lations could be justified as regulations of conduct under the O'Brien
rationale.' 8 The district court rejected these assertions, noting that the
regulations on their face prohibited theatrical entertainment, which is
entitled to first amendment protection unless obscene.' 9 Furthermore,
even granting the applicability of the O'Brien standards, the court con-
cluded they were not fulfilled, stating that "[t]he resulting restrictions on
First Amendment freedoms is considerably greater than is essential to
the furtherance of any legitimate state interest .... ,,20
In the face of this first amendment overbreadth, it seemed apparent
to the lower court that the regulations were invalid absent the required
showing of a compelling state interest.2' The state argued that its sub-
stantial interest in protecting public welfare and morals from B-girls,
prostitution, and narcotics, and its interest in protecting minors justified
the restrictions, 22 but the court summarily rejected this argument, stating
that "[n]arcotic and prostitution violations may of course be prosecuted
16. 326 F. Supp. at 357. See notes 4-14 and accompanying text supra. It should
be noted that, on appeal, the Supreme Court in LaRue specifically concurred with the
lower court's conclusion that constitutionally protected speech was proscribed. 409
U.S. at 116.
17. 326 F. Supp. at 355. The Supreme Court first articulated the constitutional
test for obscenity in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), as "whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Id. at 489. In Roth,
the court indicated that the mere fact that material contains sexual content does not
automatically cause it to lose constitutional protection. Id. at 487. See also
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). Until recently, subsequent cases
attempted to refine the Roth obscenity test, but this effort resulted in confusion due
to the widely divergent views of the justices. See, e.g., A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 413 (1966) ; Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) ; Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478
(1962). Nonetheless, the three-judge court in LaRue found, among other things, that
the regulations did not even fulfill the Roth requirement that the material be viewed
in its entirety. 326 F. Supp. at 355. It should be noted that the Court, after LaRue,
redefined and attempted to clarify obscenity standards in an opinion supported by a
majority of the justices. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973).
18. 326 F. Supp. at 355. See notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text supra.
19. 326 F. Supp. at 355. See, e.g., Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970)
(first amendment applies to actor during dramatic performance) ; In re Giannini, 69
Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968) (perfornmnce by topless dancer
entitled to first amendment protection unless obscene).
20. 326 F. Supp. at 355.
21. Id. at 355-56.
22. Id. at 355. The asserted interest in protecting minors seems spurious in
light of a pre-trial order setting forth as undisputed facts that dancing could not
be viewed from outside the premises, that those who entered were forewarned of
the type of entertainment within, and that there was no pandering. Id. at 355-56.
[ VOL. 19
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under criminal statutes, but certainly cannot be used as a vehicle to
impose censorship ....
The state further attempted to justify the regulations as a legitimate
exercise of the power vested in it by the twenty-first amendment. 24 The
court, however, distinguished the cases relied upon by the state as dealing
with the relationship of the twenty-first amendment to the commerce and
import-export clauses of the United States Constitution. 25 Thus, the
court concluded that the interests reflected by the twenty-first amend-
ment could not override those protected by the first amendment, especially
in light of the latter's preferred position.26
Notwithstanding the above reasoning, the Supreme Court in LaRue
sustained the regulations on their face as a valid exercise of the state's
power under the twenty-first amendment.27 The Court began its analysis
by reference to Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter,28 wherein it was broadly
stated that "[c] onsideration of any State law regulating intoxicating bev-
erages must begin with the [second section of the] Twenty-first Amend-
ment .... "29 Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Rehnquist expounded
on the authority conferred by the amendment, stating that it "strength-
ened" the state's regulatory power by "conferring something more than"
the traditional state police power.80 The Court expressed no doubt that
the regulations in issue were clearly within the purview of the amend-
ment, stating that "[g] iven the added presumption in favor of the validity
of the state regulation in this area that the Twenty-first Amendment
requires, we cannot hold that the regulations on their face violate the
Federal Constitution." 3' 1 Thus, two essentially novel concepts are em-
bodied in the Court's analysis: first, the Court clearly established, for
23. Id. at 355.
24. Id. at 356-57.
25. Id. at 357. The commerce clause of the Constitution gives Congress the
power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States .... "
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. The import-export clause prohibits the states from
levying imposts or duties on imports or exports without congressional consent,
except to the extent "absolutely necessary" for the execution of its inspection laws.
U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. See notes 37-49 and accompanying text infra.
26. 326 F. Supp. at 357. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), which held that the fundamental
notice and hearing requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment were applicable to a statute providing for the public posting of names of
persons who had engaged in excessive drinking. The court reasoned that "if [the
twenty-first amendment] cannot override that clause, it certainly cannot override the
First Amendment . . . ." 326 F. Supp. at 357. It is submitted, however, that
Constantineau did not address itself to the relationship of the twenty-first amendment
to the fourteenth amendment, since the only reference to the twenty-first amendment
was in the following passage:
We have no doubt as to the power of a State to deal with the evils
described in the Act. The police power of the States over intoxicating liquors
was extremely broad even prior to the Twenty-first Amendment.
400 U.S. at 436 (citation omitted). But see California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 115, 120
n.* (latter page reference to Stewart, J., concurring).
27. 409 U.S. at 118-19.
28. 384 U.S. 35 (1966).
29. Id. at 41 (emphasis added).
30. 409 U.S. at 114 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 118-19 (emphasis added).
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the first time, that state liquor licensing regulations restricting the forms
of entertainment in local establishments selling liquor by the drink are
based on the state's power under the twenty-first amendment;32 second,
the Court held that such regulations are valid on their face, even though
they proscribe expression protected by the first amendment, since the
twenty-first amendment strengthened the state's ability to regulate and
gave an added presumption to the validity of the regulations."3
The LaRue Court assumed that the California regulations were
within the purview of the twenty-first amendment; only Justice Stewart,
in his concurring opinion, developed a basis for the assumption. He
reasoned that in licensing specific establishments to sell liquor, the state
did not interfere with the first amendment activities of those establish-
ments; that is, the establishments were still entirely free to engage in
the activities, but without an accompanying sale of liquor.3 4 Thus, he
concluded that "[the state] would simply be controlling the distribution
of liquor, as it has every right to do under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment."35 Applying this reasoning, it can be argued that the Department
was simply precluding establishments which presented the proscribed
performances only from serving liquor, and not from presenting the
proscribed entertainment. This position, although not specifically de-
veloped by the majority, is supported by language in its opinion:
[Tihe critical fact is that California has not forbidden these per-
formances across the board. It has merely proscribed such perform-
ances in establishments that it licenses to sell liquor by the drink.3 6
It is submitted that the application of the twenty-first amendment in
the instant case is not warranted by either the language of the amend-
ment, its history, logic, or existing precedent. The language of the amend-
ment operates to grant a state the power to enact laws designed to regulate
the transportation or importation of intoxicating beverages. It affords no
basis for the conclusion that licensing regulations concerning local retail
sales are within the ambit of the amendment. As Justice Marshall indi-
cated in his dissent, the amendment refers only to importation, and its
legislative history indicates that it was intended only to give "dry" states
the ability to "control the flow of liquor across their boundaries," free
from traditional commerce clause limitations.37
While Justice Marshall was correct in his characterization of the
legislative history,38 it should be noted that the Court had interpreted
32. See notes 35-46 and accompanying text infra.
33. 409 U.S. at 115, 118.
34. 409 U.S. at 119-20 (Stewart, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 118.
37. 409 U.S. at 134 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
38. See 76 CONG. REc. 4140-43 (1933). See also Note, The Twenty-first Amend-
ment Versus the Interstate Commerce Clause, 55 YALE L.J. 815, 816-18 (1946)
7 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 402, 407 (1939) ; 37 Mics. L. REV. 957, 959 (1939).
[VOL. 19
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1973], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol19/iss1/5
NOVEMBER 1973] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 183
the amendment more broadly.3 9 The conclusion remains, however, that
historical reference supports the proposition that the twenty-first amend-
ment was not intended to extend to regulation of local distribution. Even
prior to the adoption of the amendment, the states had broad power to
regulate local distribution of liquor.40 Logically, it seems most unlikely
that a constitutional amendment would be proposed and adopted to dupli-
cate broad powers which the states already possessed.4 1 Rather, the
amendment apparently was intended to supplement the already existing
broad state power with the additional power to regulate, unfettered by
the commerce clause, the importation of intoxicants for delivery or use
within the state's borders.4 2 The fact that no prior decision of the Court
had directly held licensing regulations concerning retail distribution to
be within the purview of the twenty-first amendment lends further sup-
port to this conclusion.43 Only broad language in several opinions, taken
out of context, supports such a proposition. 44 It was to such language
that a federal district court, in Krauss v. Sacramento Inn,45 turned in
reaching a conclusion analogous to LaRue. Other courts, recognizing the
dichotomy of state power in this area and the limited significance of earlier
broad language, refused to extend the coverage of the twenty-first amend-
ment. 6 The LaRue Court, however, has now dissipated any doubt as
to the applicability of the amendment to local distribution.
39. See, e.g., Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944) ; Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves,
308 U.S. 132 (1939) ; Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp,, 304 U.S. 401 (1938) ; State
Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
40. In Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304 (1917), the Court stated:
It must now be regarded as settled that, on account of their well-known
noxious qualities and the extraordinary evils shown by experience commonly to
be consequent upon their use, a State has power absolutely to prohibit manu-
facture, gift, purchase, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within
its borders without violating the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 307 (citations omitted). See 8 HouSTON L. Rev. 587 (1971).
41. See note 42 infra. See also 8 HouSTON L. REv. 587, 589-90 (1971).
42. At the time the proposed amendment was being considered by the Senate,
Senator Blaine stated:
[Tihe State is not surrendering any power that it possesses, but rather, by
reason of this provision, in effect acquires power that it has not at this time.
76 CONG. REc. 4141 (1933).
43. Krauss v. Sacramento Inn, 314 F. Supp. 171, 178 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
44. For example, in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S.
324 (1964), the Court stated:
[Tihe scope of the Twenty-first Amendment with respect to a State's power
to restrict, regulate, or to prevent the traffic and distribution of intoxicants
within its borders has remained unquestioned.
Id. at 330. See Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 42 (1966) ; United States
v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 299 (1945).
45. 314 F. Supp. 171, 175-78 (E.D. Cal. 1970).
46. See, e.g., Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Sail'er Inn, Inc.
v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971). The Supreme Court
itself seems to have recognized the dichotomy of power. In Department of Revenue
v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964), the Court stated:
We have no doubt that under the Twenty-first Amendment Kentucky could
not only regulate, but could completely prohibit the importation of some in-
toxicants, or of all intoxicants, destined for distribution, use, or consumption
within its borders. There can surely be no doubt, either, of Kentucky's plenary
power to regulate and control . . . the distribution, use, or consumption of in-
toxicants within her territory after they have been imported.
Id. at 346 (emphasis added). 7
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Having reached the conclusion that the amendment applied to local
distribution, the Court additionally found that the amendment strength-
ened the state's ability to regulate by lending an "added presumption"
of validity to the challenged regulations. The Court relied upon Hostetter
v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.4 7 wherein it stated:
Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause are
parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of the Con-
stitution, each must be considered in light of the other and in the
context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case.
48
In light of the LaRue Court's analysis, one can conclude that "First
Amendment" may be inserted in lieu of "Commerce Clause" in the
Hostetter Court's language. Thus, in the context of the issues and in-
terests at stake in LaRue, a mutual consideration of both amendments
operated to alter state power so as to insulate a regulation which, on its
face, would otherwise be found constitutionally infirm on the ground of
first amendment overbreadth.
49
The significance of the LaRue Court's analysis is manifested in its
failure to apply traditional first amendment precepts when testing the
validity of regulations which concededly proscribed constitutionally pro-
tected expression in bars and nightclubs. The Court stated:
[W]e do not believe that the state regulatory authority in this case
was limited to either dealing with the problem it confronted within
the limits of our decisions as to obscenity, or in accordance with the
limits prescribed for dealing with some forms of communicative con-
duct in O'Brien .... 50
Furthermore, in stating that "wide latitude" must be afforded the state
agency which is the "repository of the State's power under the Twenty-
first Amendment," 51 the Court clearly indicated that in this case the added
presumption of validity provided by the twenty-first amendment enabled
it to avoid any consideration of first amendment overbreadth. Having
granted the state this novel discretion, the Court consequently sustained
the regulations on the basis of their reasonableness, concluding that the
Department's decision that "certain sexual performances and the dis-
pensation of liquor by the drink" should not occur simultaneously on
licensed premises was not an "irrational one."1
6 2
47. 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
48. Id. at 332.
49. See notes 15-25 and accompanying text supra. Justice Marshall sweepingly
criticized the majority's reasoning, claiming it had made the twenty-first amendment
"a pro tanto repealer of the rest of the Constitution." 409 U.S. at 135. However,
this statement is manifestly unfair, for the majority opinion plainly stated that the
amendment did not operate to supersede all other provisions of the Constitution in
the area of liquor regulations. 409 U.S. at 115, citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau,
400 U.S. 433 (1971). But see note 26 supra.
50. 409 U.S. at 116.
51. Id.
52. 409 U.S. at 118 (emphasis added).
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It must be noted that there are two significant limitations built into
this newly afforded discretion. The nature of the expression itself repre-
sents one such limitation. In assessing the reasonableness of the regula-
tions, the Court focused on the sexual import of the conduct involved,
stating that "[t]he substance of the regulations . . . prohibit . . . 'per-
formances' that partake more of gross sexuality than of communication." 53
The Court indicated that the scope of permissible state regulation signifi-
cantly increased when the expression involved the commission of public
acts which might violate legitimate penal statutes. 4 It seems clear that
the rationale of LaRue would not, of necessity, extend to regulation of
other expression. Regulations denying a liquor license to establishments
where, for example, political expression occurred would be on a differ-
ent footing. It is highly unlikely that any added presumption of validity
provided by the twenty-first amendment could cure such regulations of
their first amendment deficiency.
The second limitation on the state's discretion is expressed in a foot-
note, wherein the Court, quoting Seagram & Sons, stated:
"[A]lthough it is possible that specific future applications of the
statute may engender concrete problems of constitutional dimen-
sion, it will be time enough to consider any such problems when
they arise . .. "55
While the Court made it quite plain that even though sexual perform-
ances might be protected expression, they could be proscribed in the
context of licensing bars and nightclubs, 56 its caveat leaves open the
door for review of cases wherein there has been clear abuse of the state's
newly acquired discretion.
In conclusion, one must inquire why the Court chose to go to such
extremes to avoid a first amendment analysis. If, as demonstrated by
the legislative history, the application of the twenty-first amendment to
the regulations was unclear in the first instance, it is certainly far-fetched
to assert that the amendment gave the regulation an added presumption
of validity, sufficient, under the circumstances involved, to overcome
overbreadth objections. Furthermore, the alternative of straightforward
application of first amendment principles is seemingly innocuous. At the
worst, the regulations would have been declared overbroad on their face.
Since the Department's objective was to regulate the gross sexual activity
between entertainers and customers,57 it could have reformulated its
regulations to specifically proscribe such conduct in licensed establish-
53. Id.
54. Id. at 117.
55. Id. at 119 n.5, quoting 384 U.S. at 52.
56. 409 U.S. at 118. See text accompanying note 36 supra. In contrast, Justice
Douglas, who dissented in LaRue on the ground that the lower court should have
abstained until the state courts had given the regulations an authoritative construction,
indicated that should the regulations be construed as prohibiting protected expression,
he would find the regulations unconstitutional. 409 U.S. at 121.
57. 409 U.S. at 111.
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